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Th e Nazi Holocaust was the defi ning event of the 20th century for the West. Th e murder of six million 
Jews during World War II defi es logical comprehension and eludes proper description. Th e concentration 
camps of Auschwitz, Dachau and Buchenwald have left  a deep and indelible imprint on the collective 
consciousness of the West. When one thinks of pure evil, the images that immediately leap forward are 
those of European Jews, Nazi soldiers and barbed wire.
Th e Holocaust has become a reference point for all sorts of moral and philosophical refl ection. It has 
infl uenced the evolution of human rights norms and international law. More broadly, the social sciences 
and humanities have been deeply shaped by the horrors of the Holocaust. Given the enormity of this event 
as a moral point of departure for any discussion of ethics or human rights, it comes as shock that well into 
the 21st century we still hear voices that seek to 
deny the historical truth of the Nazi Holocaust 
and its catastrophic impact on European Jews.
Th e region of the world where this denial is 
arguably most prevalent is the Middle East and 
the larger Arab-Islamic world.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former hardline president, never missed an opportunity to off end Western 
sensibilities by engaging in Holocaust denial. He seemed to revel in this role. But it would be wrong to 
limit Holocaust denial in the Middle East to one radical leader from one country. Th ese repugnant views 
have been circulating in the Arab-Islamic world for decades, oft en with the blessing of various Middle 
Eastern governments. Sadly, these ideas have more currency across the region than most people care to 
admit. How can we explain this phenomenon? Is it merely a question of ignorance? Or is it a malicious 
sign of Islamic anti-Semitism? Where can we locate the roots of this problem?
To address these vexing questions, our Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver invited 
Gilbert Achcar, Professor of Development Studies and International Relations at the University of London’s 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), to come discuss his book Th e Arabs and the Holocaust: Th e 
Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, a monumental study that contributes to two fi elds simultaneously: Holocaust 
studies and the intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic world. Professor Michael Marrus of the University 
of Toronto calls Achcar’s book “essential reading for anyone who seeks a balanced understanding of the 
place of Jews and the Holocaust in Arab thinking today.” Professor Rashid Khalidi of Columbia University 
calls Th e Arabs and the Holocaust a “magisterial study,” a work of “breath-taking empathy, examining one 
of the most painful and emotion-laden topics in the modern world with dispassion, sensitivity and high 
erudition.” Achcar, Khalidi says, “combines a historian’s profound understanding of the workings of Arab 
political discourse with a fi ne appreciation of the traumatic valence of every aspect of this topic.”
We customarily invite members of the University of Denver’s faculty to serve as discussants at our center’s 
events, to mix it up and generate critical dialogue. When we suggested this format to Professor Achcar, 
we were thrilled that he enthusiastically embraced the idea. We are blessed to have several colleagues 
with expertise in Jewish studies and the history of the Arab-Israeli confl ict. So we asked not one but 
two scholars to participate in a panel discussion on Th e Arabs and the Holocaust with its author. Th ose 
scholars were Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder and the 
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author of numerous books, and Adam Rovner, Associate Professor of English and Jewish Literature at the 
University of Denver and the author of the new book In the Shadow of Zion: Promised Lands before Israel. 
(Full bios of all three scholars are at the end of this paper.)
Th e panel discussion, which we held the evening of May 13, 2014, was among the most intellectually 
fruitful events our center has organized. It was an enormously stimulating and spirited exchange, fi rst 
among the panelists and then with the audience.
Th is Occasional Paper presents an edited transcript of that evening’s discussion. But the paper opens with 
an edited transcript of a brief interview I conducted with Professor Achcar at our Center for Middle East 
Studies. Th at interview provides an overview of Th e Arabs and the Holocaust and thus serves to frame the 
panel discussion that follows.
In keeping with the mandate of our center, we are disseminating this text in the hope that it will contribute to 
greater understanding of one of the most recurring, perplexing and emotionally charged issues emanating 
from the Middle East today. Th is is by no means the fi nal word on this topic, but it is an enormously 
important intervention on this poorly understood subject. In bringing together these three distinguished 
scholars and juxtaposing their perspectives in this critical exchange, this text makes a unique contribution 
to the literature.
We hope that you will benefi t from reading it.
Nader Hashemi
Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
Associate Professor of Middle East and Islamic Politics
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
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Hashemi:  
I’ve been reading your very important book Th e Arabs and the Holocaust, and I’d like you to explain, in 
broad terms, the prevalence and the persistence of Holocaust denial in the Arab-Islamic world today.
While most people are aware of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric on the 
topic, there is a less well-known episode that really highlights the question I’d like you to address. You 
discuss it in the book. I’m referring to Roger Garaudy, the famous French ex-Communist and convert 
to Islam, who published a book in 1996 called Les Mythes fondateurs de la politique israelienne, later 
translated into English as Th e Founding Myths of Modern Israel. Th is book contained arguments that 
contributed to Holocaust denial. When Garaudy travelled to the Arab world he was celebrated as a 
hero by people across the political spectrum — left /right, secular/religious — in part due to this book. 
Th is story would seem to confi rm the worst stereotypes that many North Americans and Europeans 
have about the Arab and Islamic world. How do you explain the persistence of Holocaust denial in the 
Arab-Islamic world today?
Achcar: 
Actually, not only has it persisted, but has actually been expanding over the last few decades. And 
there is already a clue to the answer to your question in the fact that this is happening at a time of 
heightening tensions between the Arab world, the Palestinians in particular, and the Israeli state. We 
have witnessed an increase in Israeli violence, starting with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon followed by 
18 years of occupation, with violence peaking again with Israel’s second major onslaught on Lebanon 
in 2006. Th is last episode was extremely intensive in brutality and destruction, as were the two rounds 
of Israeli bombing of Gaza in June 2006 and December 2008-January 2009. 
All this took place against a background of bitter disillusionment with regard to the hopes created 
by the Oslo agreement and the so-called peace process aft er 1993. Th e euphoria of peace was very 
short-lived indeed: the Palestinians faced an increase in the expansion of Israeli settlements in the 
territories occupied since 1967, which 
destroyed all expectations, or rather illusions, 
about the peace process. Th is general 
background provides a key to understanding 
why Holocaust denial has been expanding in 
Arab countries and beyond them, in Muslim-
majority countries. 
Th e Anti-Zionism of Fools
It is in many ways a symptom of the 
increasing resentment against the state of Israel. Much of it, of course, is based on a very simplistic gut 
reaction, what I call the anti-Zionism of fools. Th e idea is that, since the state of Israel is seen as heavily 
exploiting the Holocaust, justifying everything it does by reference to the Jewish genocide and using it 
The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives
A Conversation between Nader Hashemi and Gilbert Achcar
“I call it the anti-Zionism of fools. The idea is that since Israel is exploiting the Holocaust, justifying everything it does by reference to the Jewish genocide and using it to reject any criticism, it must therefore be exaggerating the Holocaust to exert moral blackmail.
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to reject any criticism—telling the United States and Europe that they have no right to criticize Israel 
because they took part in the Holocaust or failed to prevent it—Israel must therefore be exaggerating 
the Holocaust and building up a myth in order to exert moral blackmail on the West. Th is is how the 
simplistic reasoning goes. 
Th us, as more anger and resentment against the Israeli state build, the more people who are inspired 
by these feelings will tend to deny the Holocaust, believing that it is a way of being anti-Zionist. But it 
is actually an anti-Zionism of fools in the sense that it is fully counterproductive and does not harm 
Israel in the least. Instead, Arab Holocaust deniers render a major service to Zionist propaganda by 
confi rming its claims that the Arabs are Nazi-sympathizing anti-Semites.
In the book, I quote Palestinian opinion surveys conducted by the University of Haifa. Th ese surveys 
show very clearly the close correlation that exists between the increase in Holocaust denial and the 
tensions between the Palestinian community and the Israeli state.
Th is is basically the kind of mechanism at work, combined with much ignorance about the Holocaust 
in Arab countries — not among the Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship, but among the rest of 
the Palestinians and Arabs who have very little education about the Holocaust. It is a taboo issue in the 
Arab world, born of the same foolish logic according to which anyone who acknowledges this huge 
historical tragedy is lending credit to the Zionist cause. 
And again, this is very shortsighted. Anyone keen on preventing Israel from instrumentalizing the 
Holocaust should start by fully acknowledging the Jewish genocide perpetrated by the Nazis as one 
of the most horrible crimes against humanity in history, and then — and only then — reject Israel’s 
right to use this tragedy as a justifi cation for actions that clash with any humanistic understanding of 
the lessons of the Holocaust.
Th ese are lessons that indeed repudiate any form of discrimination — racial, ethnic, religious, gender-
based — and all forms of military brutality, of Machtpolitik, of the law of the jungle, of rule by force, of 
the politics of conquest. Th is is what the lessons of the Holocaust are about.
Hashemi:
You make the very interesting point, which you just hinted at in your answer, that one reason Holocaust 
denial exists in the Arab-Islamic world is due to the decline of politics. In other words, the decline of 
open societies, the absence of political freedom, of open debate and the inability to have an honest 
conversation about history without being subjected to government censorship and manipulation. You 
suggest that had these conditions not existed during the latter half of the 20th century and into the 
21st, perhaps the problem you’re talking about today would not have existed in the same form it did 
— and does.
Achcar:
Indeed. But this is, in some way, almost a structural condition, one that goes back several decades, 
whereas there is another element at play here, more directly relevant. It is the shift  in the region’s 
political environment from the 1950s and 1960s, into the 1970s, when the dominant discourse in 
popular politics was left ward oriented, to subsequent decades, when Islamic fundamentalism took 
over. Th e region’s politics thus shift ed from left -leaning nationalism, principally represented by 
Nasserism, to the gamut of Islamic fundamentalist currents. 
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And of course this ideological setting — the religious fundamentalist prism — facilitates the kind 
of perception that leads to Holocaust denial. It facilitates the “essentialization” of the confl ict. Th at 
is to say, if you hold an Islamic fundamentalist 
Weltanschauung, you will tend to look at the 
confl ict with Israel as one pitting Muslims 
against Jews, and you will tend to downplay the 
distinction between Zionism and the Jews that 
left -wing nationalism emphasized, when it used 
to assert: “We are not against the Jews, we are 
against Zionism, and against racism in general.” 
Aft er the book came out, I did research on the 
coverage of the Eichmann trial in the Egyptian 
newspaper Al-Ahram, which was the mouthpiece of Nasser’s regime. I examined two years of Al-
Ahram, 1960-62. Th e result of my study was published in the Spring 2012 issue of the Arab Studies 
Journal under a title echoing Hannah Arendt’s famous Eichmann in Jerusalem. My article is titled 
“Eichmann in Cairo.” Th e article illuminates the diff erences between the types of discourses dominant 
today versus 50 years ago.
During the two years of coverage of the Eichmann trial in Al-Ahram, there was hardly any attempt 
to deny the Holocaust, or even the fi gure of six million Jews having perished as a result of the Nazi 
genocide, and no attempt whatsoever to deny Eichmann’s responsibility or express any kind of 
sympathy toward him.
Th ere was, of course, much criticism of Israel’s exploitation of the Eichmann aff air in order to justify 
its own anti-Arab policies, but a clear distinction was consistently drawn between Jews and Zionism. 
So it was a discourse which, compared to the kind of discourse that prevails today in large sections of 
the Arab media and public opinion, appears very enlightened indeed.
Hashemi:
Correct me if I’m wrong but are you arguing that if the Israel-Palestine confl ict could be solved 
tomorrow in a just way for both sides, then Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism would start to decline 
in the Arab-Islamic world?
Achcar:
I have little doubt about that. We did not have opinion surveys on this issue at the time, but I am pretty 
sure that when the illusions about Oslo were at their peak, Holocaust denial had fallen sharply among 
Palestinians. Th e reason for this is relatively easy to understand. 
German or Austrian Holocaust denial, for example, can be based on rabid anti-Semitism or on rabid 
nationalism in the denial of a genocide perpetrated by the deniers’ own country. Th e diff erence is 
that the Arabs were not the perpetrators of the Holocaust, so it in fact costs Arabs nothing to do what 
Mahmoud Abbas recently did, acknowledging that the Holocaust was “the most heinous crime against 
humanity” in modern times, the most appalling tragedy of the 20th century.
It should be no problem for any Palestinian or Arab to acknowledge this historical truth since it 
provides no justifi cation whatsoever for what was done to the Palestinians, precisely because they 
“Religious fundamentalism facilitates the ‘essentialization’ of the conﬂ ict. Fundamentalists tend to look at the conﬂ ict as one pitting Muslims against Jews, downplaying the distinction between Zionism and the Jews that left-wing nationalism emphasized.
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neither bear nor share any responsibility whatsoever for perpetrating the Holocaust. Th e fact is, 
however, that one central eff ort of Zionist propaganda in the “Arab-Israeli war of narratives” — as I 
called it in the subtitle of the book — has been to “Nazify” the Arabs and Palestinians, and portray 
them as bearing some responsibility for the Holocaust.
Hashemi:
In this context, one of the interesting things you discuss in the book is that in the Encyclopedia of the 
Holocaust, the entry on the Muft i of Jerusalem is longer than the entry for Adolf Eichmann. Th at is 
both shocking and revealing.
Achcar:
Yes indeed. Th e biographical entry for Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Muft i of Jerusalem, is longer than 
those of all the key fi gures of Nazism, with the exception of Hitler himself. Th e fi rst one to comment 
on this was the late Peter Novick, the University of Chicago historian and author of Th e Holocaust in 
American Life (1999), a seminal work.
Hashemi:
He blurbed your book.
Achcar:
Indeed. Th e Israeli historian Tom Segev has noted that visitors to Yad Vashem, the memorial to the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Jerusalem, get the impression that Amin al-Husseini played a major 
role in the Holocaust. But this is sheer propaganda, devoid of any historical accuracy.
Hashemi:
Th is is highly revealing. It demonstrates how the persistence of the Israel-Palestine confl ict has led to 
a distortion in history not only on the Arab and Islamic side, but also on the Israeli and Zionist side 
as well.
Achcar: 
Of course. Add to this an even more important consideration. On the one hand, there is the fact 
that, in the same way that Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic attitudes abound in the Arab world, so 
does anti-Arab racism in Israel. Civil rights organizations in Israel and prominent critical fi gures of 
the Israeli intelligentsia have denounced this pervasive racism, which is integral to the institutional 
structure of the Israeli state and the way it functions.
Hashemi:  
And it’s getting worse.
Achcar: 
Indeed. Th ere is open institutional anti-Arab discrimination in Israel working through the cynical 
requisite of having to serve in the army in order to access several categories of jobs and positions, 
knowing that Arabs are “exempted” from military service.
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Nakba Denial
On the other hand, while it is true that Holocaust 
denial is widespread in Arab countries, does 
the Israeli state not offi  cially deny the Nakba
(the “Catastrophe” of 1948 from the Palestinian 
point of view)? Even the Israeli historian Benny 
Morris, aft er his metamorphosis from left -wing New Historian to right-wing revisionist Zionist — or 
“neo-Zionist,” as they are called — did not hesitate to publicly describe what the Zionists did to the 
Palestinians in 1948 as “ethnic cleansing.” And yet this crime is offi  cially denied by the Israeli state.
Th is denial is actually far more serious than that of Arabs — whether Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians 
or others — who deny the Holocaust, a genocide for which they bear no responsibility. Here we are 
talking about a state that denies what it itself perpetrated. Of course the Nakba was not a genocide, but 
it was nevertheless an act of ethnic cleansing, which is a crime against humanity by international legal 
standards, albeit of a lesser magnitude than genocide.
So here is a state still denying a crime it perpetrated, in the same way that the Turkish state, for instance, 
still denies the Armenian genocide. Such attitudes are much more serious than denial of the Holocaust 
by Arabs, whether out of ignorance combined with foolishness, or out of political foolishness alone.
Hashemi:
Your book is a major contribution to both Arab intellectual history and to the literature on Holocaust 
studies. It’s a fascinating read. I thank you for writing it.
Achcar: 
Very kind of you.
Israeli Nakba denial is actually far more 
serious Arab Holocaust denial. Arabs bear 
no responsibility for the Holocaust. With 
Nakba denial, we are talking about a 
state that denies what it itself perpetrated.
Page 9
A Panel Discussion on Gilbert Achcar’s The Arabs and the Holocaust: 
The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives
Ira Chernus 
Adam Rovner
Gilbert Achcar
The Holocaust Narrative as a Conversation Stopper
Ira Chernus
Th ank you for inviting me to respond to the work of a scholar as eminent as 
Gilbert Achcar. It’s a great honor. 
Th is is an unusual event because we are in the United States talking about the 
Israeli-Palestinian confl ict and focusing on the issue of narrative. Typically 
Americans deal with this issue by focusing on facts. Th ey assume that if they 
collect enough facts they will be able to fi gure out who is right and who is wrong. 
But I’ve been in debates with supporters of Israeli policy for decades now, and I realized long ago that 
it’s naïve to think anyone will change their minds just by hearing facts. Th e debate goes on so fi ercely 
because we all begin with diff erent assumptions, assumptions that combine to form narratives. We cling 
to our narratives, and they tell us which facts we should ignore, which ones we should focus on, and how 
we should interpret those facts. Th en we throw our facts at each other in an endless volley that simply 
cements each side more fi rmly in its own view. As Professor Achcar reminds us, the heart of the confl ict 
is not about diff erent facts but diff erent narratives.
Israelis and Palestinians have known this for a long time. Th ey take it for granted that the confl ict is driven 
by competing narratives. But here in the US we have such faith in the power of facts that we generally 
overlook the essential role of narratives. So it’s really refreshing to have a dialogue like this devoted to the 
essential role of stories. And, as Professor Achcar also reminds us, we cannot understand the stories that 
shape political life in the present unless we examine their history.
I want to broaden the conversation by looking briefl y at the history of the story of the Holocaust as it has 
been told in the United States. 
While the Holocaust was happening, American news media reported on it, but few Americans paid much 
attention. Very few thought that they were fi ghting against Germany to stop the extermination of Jews. 
Aft er the war, the Holocaust was largely forgotten. By the 1950s, even American Jews paid little attention 
to it. When surveys asked them about the essential factors of their Jewish identity, they rarely mentioned 
the Holocaust. 
Th at changed dramatically during the Six-Day War of 1967. Jews in the US off ered an unexpected outpouring 
of support for Israel, and the large majority accepted the narrative that had long been commonplace 
among most Israeli Jews. Th eir story said Israel had arisen from the ashes of the Holocaust to make sure 
it never happened again, the Arabs were bent on exterminating the Jews, and only Israel’s military might 
could prevent another Holocaust. “Ein breira — We have no choice,” the Israeli government said. “We 
must fi ght, win and occupy Palestinian lands to stave off  another Holocaust.” 
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Historians are still debating how much danger Israel really faced in 1967. But few American Jews doubted 
Israel’s story. For the fi rst time, the memory of the Holocaust became central in American Jewish life, 
since it seemed to justify Israel’s massive military violence and the occupation. Th roughout the 1970s, that 
story grew into a dogma among most American Jews.
However Jews did not have as much infl uence over US policy as most people think. As the US poured 
military aid into Israel during the ‘67 war and again in the war of 1973, the American media made the 
Israeli Holocaust narrative commonplace among American gentiles too. Israel had proven itself militarily 
invulnerable. Yet the common view here was that Israel was always the underdog, constantly threatened 
with extinction.
By 1973 that was becoming an especially common story among gentile conservatives. Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger were easing Cold War tensions, and conservatives launched a campaign to return to a 
more hawkish, pre-Vietnam policy stance. 
One of their weapons was an attack on the Nixon-Kissinger eff ort to mediate the Israeli-Arab confl ict. 
Th ey charged that the president and his chief advisor were growing soft , that they were not giving all-out 
support to an imperiled Israel and so were increasing the chances of another Holocaust. It was a powerful, 
emotionally-charged narrative that helped make extreme conservatives dominant in the Republican party. 
Th ose conservatives also got a boost from the growing ranks of the evangelical Christian Right. Most 
evangelicals embraced the story that the Holocaust was the reason for Israel’s being and that only a huge 
boost in US military aid could prevent another Holocaust. 
Th e election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 sealed the conservative victory. By then the narrative linking the 
Holocaust to all-out support of Israel was virtually dogma across most of the political spectrum. So most 
Americans took the fi rst intifada, in the late 1980s, as proof that the Palestinians wanted to wipe out the 
Jews. Only a minority of us recognized the intifada as a war of national liberation. 
Th ough the Oslo Agreement brought hope 
for Israeli-Palestinian peace, most Americans 
continued to see Israel as an imperiled victim 
of potential Arab violence. Th at view seemed to 
be confi rmed by the second intifada, in the early 
2000s. 
But then, a few years ago, something very 
surprising began to happen. Gradually, more and more Jews in the US began to question the received 
narrative. Th ey began to ask whether an unjust Israeli policy bore the greatest share of responsibility for 
keeping the confl ict going. And they began to ask whether Israel’s Holocaust narrative had been used for 
political purposes, to legitimate the injustice and perpetuate the confl ict. Th at is now a matter of debate 
— sometimes very intense debate — within the American Jewish community. 
Th e growing Jewish skepticism about this Israeli story has given gentile Americans permission to begin 
to question it too. Some liberals have begun to criticize Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, and public 
opinion polls show that sympathy for Israeli policy dropping.
Most conservatives, though, and especially evangelical Christians, still give unwavering support to Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and militant repression of Palestinians. And overall public support for the 
Palestinian cause remains quite low, far lower than support for Israel. 
“Gradually, more and more Jews in the US began to question the received narrative. They began to ask whether Israel’s Holocaust narrative had been used for political purposes, to legitimate the injustice and perpetuate the conﬂ ict.
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One main reason for this disparity in US public opinion is the persistent grip of Israel’s Holocaust narrative. 
Even many liberals, who have given up knee-jerk support of Israeli policy, still have a sort of knee-jerk 
acceptance of the familiar Holocaust narrative: Even if Israel has gone too far in protecting itself, they 
say, it still has some basic security needs, and all Jews have some basic emotional needs, that must be 
addressed, because all are haunted by the memory of the Holocaust and the very real fear that it could 
happen again. 
Th is narrative makes American liberals hesitate to voice strong support for the Palestinian cause or 
consider Palestinian security needs. Th ey fear that they’ll be viewed as forgetting the Holocaust, or not 
caring enough about its horrors. In that way, the Holocaust narrative becomes a conversation-stopper 
and thus a trump card in the hands of conservatives, nearly all of them gentiles, who lead the campaign 
to keep US policy heavily tilted toward Israel. 
Th is brings us to the very practical eff ect of the American Holocaust narrative. In the recent round of 
US-led negotiations, which have ended at least for now, the Obama administration presented itself as an 
even-handed mediator. In fact there is abundant evidence that the talks failed because the administration 
continued the traditional US tilt toward Israel; it refused to pressure the Israeli government to follow 
through on its promised concessions. 
Th e dominant public story, though, is that the talks failed because the Palestinian Authority agreed to a 
unity deal with Hamas. Th e Obama administration backed the Israeli government in denouncing this as a 
totally unacceptable move, something dastardly enough to justify ending the talks. And this made perfect 
sense to most Americans because Hamas is now cast in the public narrative as the body most likely to 
instigate another Holocaust. Th e long-standing Hamas off er of de facto acceptance of Israel is ignored, 
because it doesn’t fi t the dominant narrative. 
So the Holocaust narrative continues to exert its potent eff ect on public opinion here, especially among 
gentile conservatives. Ironically and tragically, as Professor Achcar’s work reveals, there is more debate 
about the meaning of the Holocaust among Palestinians than there is among Americans. And that just 
may be the biggest factor preventing the US from being a truly even-handed broker leading the way to a 
just peace. 
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Arab and Jewish Nationalisms in Gilbert Achcar’s Narrative
Adam Rovner
I am not an historian or a political scientist, so I was somewhat reluctant to take 
up Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel’s invitation to participate in this panel 
on Professor Achcar’s Th e Arabs and Th e Holocaust. Aft er all, I am a professor 
of literature. Among my areas of expertise are modern Hebrew literature and 
Holocaust literature, so I do at least know something about narratives. In 
particular, I have intimate knowledge, owing to my having lived in Israel for 
several years, of the Israeli narrative of the Holocaust — which forms part of the 
subtitle of Professor Achcar’s work.
Th e Arabs and the Holocaust is oft en a brave book. I read it cover to cover and found 
in it a wealth of information based on what is clearly voluminous research. Professor Achcar’s sympathies, 
it should be clear, are with the liberal westernizers and the Arab Marxists about whom he writes. We 
should remember that it was these constituencies in the Arab world who were most consistently opposed 
to Nazism. Achcar views nationalism, broadly defi ned, as a danger to liberal humanist values. He is a 
forceful critic of fundamentalist Arab nationalist 
strains for their opportunistic adoption, in some 
cases, of Nazi rhetoric. And he is vociferous in his 
condemnation of the reactionary pan-Islamists 
who give vent to unrepentant anti-Semitism 
and exterminationist rhetoric. All this history 
Professor Achcar sets out in his book’s fi rst part 
— “Th e Time of the Shoah.”
He provides this valuable knowledge base in 
order to contextualize the second part of his 
book, which concerns Arab reactions to the Jews and the Holocaust, as well as Israeli reactions to the 
Nakba. Although those of a conservative bent would probably take issue with a book structured in this way 
— part one, “Th e Time of the Shoah” and part two, “Th e Time of the Nakba” — I fi nd this organization to 
make sense according to the internal logic of the narrative Achcar structures. Th e discordant reference to 
both the Shoah and the Nakba may well be provocative to those who fear that in such a contiguity a sense 
of “equation” between the Nazi war against the Jews and the on-going dispossession and occupation of 
Palestinians will be established. Let me be clear here and say that Achcar does not make such an equation. 
In fact he explicitly rejects such rhetoric, the implicit contrapuntal eff ect of his argument notwithstanding. 
Th is rejection of facile comparisons is to Achcar’s credit and speaks to the candor of his work. Nonetheless, 
the internal logic of the book is at times troubling.
As I understand it, Achcar’s logic is that the Holocaust, a catastrophe for the Jewish world and indeed for 
humanity itself, precipitated a calamity for the Palestinians. Again, this point may ruffl  e some feathers, 
but Achcar would fi nd many Israelis and non-Israeli Zionists in accord with this notion. Now, it remains 
an open historiographical question as to whether Israel would have come into existence without the 
Holocaust. Professor Achcar does not believe it would have; I believe it would have. Th ere’s no way to 
answer this counterfactual question of Israel’s (non)establishment. Th at is best left  for parlor games — or 
novels — rather than history. One thing is for certain: Israel would not look as it does today, nor would 
the Jewish state have developed in the manner it has, without the Holocaust. Achcar is on very fi rm 
The discordant reference to both the Shoah 
and the Nakba may well be provocative 
to those who fear that a sense of 
“equation” between the Nazi war against 
the Jews and the on-going dispossession 
and occupation of Palestinians will be 
established.
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ground in his analysis that the public discourse, political commemorations, and institutional memories 
of the Holocaust in Israel are oft en predicated on just such a linkage between catastrophe — Shoah — and 
national rebirth. Th e two concepts, Shoah and rebirth — tkumah — are indeed oft en connected. One 
word follows the other in an almost automatic call-and-response in Hebrew-speaking Israeli society: 
“shoah v’tkumah.” 
Th e internal logic of Achcar’s book naturally reveals the author’s ideological position. He is opposed to 
“anti-Semitism,” but he also opposes “Zionism.” Unfortunately, he does not defi ne Zionism, which never 
really was and is not now a monolithic ideology — and this is a shortcoming. Achcar may not be well-
versed in the diff ering strains of Zionism as they emerged historically from the late 19th century through 
the mid-20th century. Students of Zionism, however, will fi nd this aspect of his work a weak point. 
Achcar discerns a tendency in Israeli sources to treat “the Arabs” as a monolithic entity without regard 
to the fractious ideologies held by Arab intellectuals and statesmen. Th is is certainly true, but the fact 
that he himself does not adequately treat the nuances of Zionist ideology is problematic. Th is substantial 
oversight obscures the central issue at stake in Achcar’s work: he is an avowed anti-Zionist. His objection 
to Zionism, however nebulously defi ned, stems from his left ist commitments to fi ght against imperialism, 
colonialism, racism, and ethnocentrism, and his determination to see “justice” done. “Justice” contains a 
powerful charge, but the problem is that the more vaguely defi ned the term is, the less powerful its charge. 
Now, to return to what I might call Achcar’s “principled” anti-Zionism. He sees Zionism and the State 
of Israel as an imperialist or colonialist entity that is essentially racist or ethnocentric. It would be mere 
apologetics to deny that successive Israeli governments have perpetrated forms of settler colonialism and 
that the State of Israel is de facto, if not de jure, “ethnocentric” — if by this term we (problematically) 
understand Jews to be an ethnicity. Th e charge of imperialism may hold to some extent as well. Even before 
the British issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised a Jewish national home in Palestine, the 
Zionist Organization incorporated its bank in England in order to fund settlement in Ottoman Palestine 
on the model of Cecil Rhodes’ Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Achcar seems to be unaware of this fact, but the 
historical record of this fi nancial cornerstone of Zionism is beyond dispute; its signifi cance, of course, is 
what disputes are made of. 
As to the charge of colonialism, it is true that certain elements of “settler colonialism” are present in the 
case of contemporary Israel, though others are absent. Even as a non-specialist, I believe it is absolutely 
clear that Israeli settlement over the 1967 border, the Green Line, reveals characteristics of “formal settler 
colonialism.” Now to the question of whether 
Zionism is inherently racist. Since it would be an 
error to identify Jews as a “race,” I don’t see how 
this can be the case. Of course, I understand that 
the term can be used broadly, but I think it’s best 
to be as precise as possible in these matters. Th e 
charge of “racism” is oft en used rhetorically by 
those who object to Israeli policies (or Israel’s very 
existence) and is best left  to polemics. Achcar’s 
book is not a polemic but a controversial work 
of scholarship. Th e much thornier problem is whether Zionism is “ethnocentric.” Yes, I suppose it is, but 
probably no more so than any other national movement that gained momentum in the 20th century. On 
balance, Achcar’s claims that Zionism adheres to a colonialist model, prospered under imperialism, and 
remains as ethno-territorialist as every other ethnic territorialism appears to me to be correct. 
“What we ﬁ nd in Achcar’s anti-Zionism is a kind of internationalist Marxism that imagines a prelapsarian world where every group knew its place and stayed there. But mass dislocation, conquest, and usurpation deﬁ ne both the modern and pre-modern worlds.
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Th is all sounds like powerful condemnation, and coming from Achcar it is. Right-thinking people — and 
by right-thinking, I mean left -thinking people — are opposed to colonialism. And all right-thinking people 
fi nd it objectionable to profi t from imperial adventurism. And all right-thinking people oppose ethno-
territorialism. Th e problem is, we’re not really opposed to profi ting from imperialism and colonialism. If 
we were, we’d all pack up and move back to where we came from, unless we’re Native American. Th e US 
hasn’t returned territory to native tribes, or to Mexico or Spain for that matter. Australia hasn’t returned 
land to its aboriginal peoples either. Nor has China or Russia, though perhaps we shouldn’t expect much 
of those countries. Nor have any Central American or South American governments set sail for Europe 
and left  their indigenous peoples in charge. My point is that colonial entities and the profi ting from 
past colonialisms exist today, contrary to Achcar’s assertion that “the Palestinian question [is] the last 
major burning issue of European colonialism” (26). Th e US, Australia, and Brazil may not fall under the 
“burning issues” category, but only because they to a large extent extinguished the opposition. China and 
Russia aren’t open societies so they can easily put out whatever rebellious fi res fl are up. 
What we really fi nd in Achcar’s anti-Zionism is a kind of internationalist Marxism that imagines a 
prelapsarian world where every group knew its place and stayed there. Or failing that, that we recognize 
the errors of our ways and link arms and march 
towards a brighter, social revolutionary future. 
Unfortunately, the former position does not 
accord with reality and the latter is unlikely to 
ever come to pass. Mass dislocation, emigration, 
conquest, settlement, usurpation, profi teering, 
exploitation, and population shift s not only 
defi ne the modern world, they defi ned the pre-
modern world as well. But these are big questions that take me a bit far afi eld from Achcar’s text itself. And 
my real concern with the book is that Professor Achcar seems to allow for various expressions of liberal 
Arab nationalism, the more Marxist the better, but not for liberal Jewish nationalism.
What do I mean? My close reading of the book makes it seem as if no territorial sovereignty should be 
allowed Jews in Israel/Palestine, if not practically than at least in principle. I point here to the last dozen 
or so pages of the book wherein Achcar describes a speech made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
in 2008 — a speech that the author characterizes in the following way: “…she congratulated a bellicose 
state that has continued to occupy the territory of its neighbors for sixty years…” (281). I understand that 
Professor Achcar means that Israel has for 60 years — that is, since 1948, since the state’s internationally 
recognized legal establishment — occupied Palestinian land. On its own, the statement is defensible, at 
least from Achcar’s partisan position. Still, this is a strange position for him to take. So far as I’m aware, 
with the exception of the fundamentalist pan-Islamists that Achcar rejects, no Palestinian negotiating 
position has been based on this notion of Israel’s fundamental illegitimacy for decades. Likewise, while 
various Arab states and peoples — the Egyptians, the Palestinians, the Lebanese, for example — are allowed 
their expressions of nationalism in Achcar’s book, Jews are not allowed their nationalism. Th e subtext of 
all his assertions — and I could be misreading him — is that Jews are in essence a religious group, not a 
national entity. Th is would come as news to many millions of Jews. Achcar’s fundamental delegitimization 
of Jewish claims to national sympathies comes across as a very strange way to mend what he presents as a 
tragic war of narratives between Israelis and Arabs.
Despite these criticisms, I retain a profound respect for much of Achcar’s book. In fact I am in agreement 
with him about a great deal even though I am a Zionist, albeit a rather idiosyncratic one. Israeli policy has 
“Achcar’s fundamental delegitimization of Jewish claims to national sympathies comes across as a very strange way to mend what he presents as a tragic war of narratives between Israelis and Arabs.
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certainly tilted to the right and continues to do so. Th e fact that leading Israeli politicians maintain a belief 
that the country’s military can force a settlement is certainly wrong-headed. Israeli historiography does 
indeed tend to exaggerate Arab support for the Nazis. Th at the anti-Semitic muft i Hajj Amin al-Husseini 
features as a major villain in Israeli (and other) narratives of the Holocaust is not in doubt. But it’s not 
surprising that al-Husseini has come to symbolize Arab fundamentalism to Israelis and others. Al-Husseini 
was indeed a fundamentalist who spent much of World War II as a guest of Hitler. According to Achcar 
himself, al-Husseini “came to represent the Arab majority view in Palestine” aft er 1936 (43). Achcar notes 
that only “60% of Palestinians supported the Nazis in 1941” (46). Th at is, he fi nds it signifi cant that even 
during the Reich’s greatest period of triumph, a signifi cant minority of Palestinians opposed the Nazis. 
Al-Husseini represented the majority view, as Achcar himself indicates, and even aft er the war when his 
ties to Nazi leaders and the crimes of the Th ird Reich came to light, the muft i assumed the presidency of 
the Arab Higher Committee, which represented Arab national demands on Palestine. One can therefore 
understand how the muft i has loomed large in the Israeli national consciousness.
Educated Israelis are not ignorant of Palestinian suff ering. Most do know what the Nakba refers to, though 
many treat the narrative of Palestinian dispossession and their continued occupation with a shrug, or 
justify the state of aff airs by pointing to perceived Arab intransigence. Th is has not always been the case. 
Canonical Jewish Israeli authors such as Benjamin Tammuz and S. Yizhar [Yizhar Smilansky] described 
Palestinian expulsion and domination with great sensitivity in widely-read literary works as early as the 
1940s. None of this is really news to Israelis then, or the least bit controversial to the country’s intelligentsia. 
To underscore my claim, let me end here with a quote from Emil Habibi, a Palestinian-Israeli communist, 
and a humane and well-regarded author. He addressed the following in 1986 to Israeli Hebrew readers 
in the journal Politka: “Had it not been for your Shoah […] then the calamity that remains the lot of my 
people [the Palestinians] would not have been possible” (Emil Habibi, “Your Holocaust — Our Disaster,” 
Politika 8: 26-27 (1986): 26-27. [Hebrew]). 
Achcar’s important book exists as a valuable and detailed commentary on Habibi’s nearly thirty-year old 
passage. But we should note that this position — Habibi’s and Achcar’s — has been stated and restated, 
contested and upheld for decades in Israel, by both Jews and Palestinians, by both Zionists and anti-
Zionists.
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The Mote and the Beam: A Response to Ira Chernus and Adam Rovner
Gilbert Achcar
Th ank you very much indeed, Professor Chernus and Professor Rovner, for your highly 
stimulating comments. It is truly an honor and a pleasure for me to have this discussion 
with both of you. 
Let me start with one issue related to Professor Chernus’s comment on the United States: 
the issue of US responsibility in the Holocaust, which I deem to be very important, 
though oft en overlooked. Here is actually a major illustration of the parable of “the 
mote and the beam.” Th e fact that this country closed its doors to Jewish immigration in the most crucial 
period certainly played a major role in increasing the numbers of the victims of the Holocaust. 
In his excellent book Th e Seventh Million: Th e Israelis and the Holocaust, the historian Tom Segev — 
commenting on a proposal that Israeli citizenship be posthumously conferred upon all Holocaust victims 
— observes that many of them died precisely because they did not want to move to Palestine; in other 
words, they did not adhere to the Zionist project. And there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority 
of European Jews would have much preferred to come to the United States than go to Palestine — not an 
attractive destination in their eyes. 
Th at is also why it took the agreement between 
the Zionist movement and the Nazi authorities 
in 1933, the Haavara Agreement, to, in some 
way, force German Jews to go to Palestine as the 
only destination where they could transfer part 
of their capital or belongings. Th is was when the 
Nazis’ response to the Jewish presence in Germany — before engaging in the “fi nal solution,” that is the 
genocide, starting from 1941 — was still to turn the country Judenrein, “rid of Jews,” by way of deportation, 
expulsion, or “ethnic cleansing” as we would call it today.
It is indeed important to point to US responsibility in that regard, as well as to the responsibility of Britain, 
another country which did far from everything it could to provide a safe haven to European Jews. And 
they were not alone. At the Evian Conference organized by Franklin Roosevelt in 1938, in an attempt 
to fi nd outlets for European Jews, each of the 32 countries represented (with the single exception of the 
Dominican Republic) found some pretext or excuse to explain that they could not accept any more Jewish 
refugees.
And yet you oft en hear the argument that the Palestinians bear responsibility in the Holocaust because 
they did not let Jewish immigration into Palestine continue at the same pace aft er 1939, when of course 
there were already many more European Jewish migrants in Palestine in proportion to the autochthonous 
population than in any other country on earth.
Having made this additional comment, I thoroughly agree with Professor Chernus’s assessment of the 
image of Israel and its uses in US domestic politics.
Let me turn now to the points made by Professor Rovner. As he emphasized — and I thank him for that 
— I do not draw any equivalence between the Shoah and the Nakba. In this respect, I was glad when 
Mahmoud Abbas recently described the Holocaust as “the most heinous crime to have occurred against 
humanity in the modern era.”
“The Holocaust has had more impact on Arab history than on any other non-Western histories.
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Th e division of my book into two parts — part one, “Th e Time of the Shoah” and part two, “Th e Time of 
the Nakba” — is done, of course, with regard to Arab history, since it is a book about the Arabs and the 
Holocaust. Th is is not to say that, from the Arab point of view, the Shoah and the Nakba are equivalent 
in scope, but that the Shoah bears direct relevance to Arab history inasmuch as it played a key role in the 
production of the Nakba and the creation of the state of Israel. Otherwise, the Shoah would bear no more 
relevance for the Arabs than it bears for the South Asians or the East Asians. 
Th is connection to the Holocaust, the fact that the Holocaust has had more impact on Arab history than 
on any other non-Western histories, is what lies behind the statement by Emil Habibi that Professor 
Rovner quoted. It reminds me of another statement by Mahmoud Darwish that I cite in my book: he 
said in an interview with the Israeli poet Helit Yeshurun that “the international interest in the Palestinian 
question merely refl ects the interest people take in the Jewish question.”
Th is is certainly true for Western public opinion. If the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict holds such importance 
in Western public debate — proportionally more than most other regional confl icts if we consider the 
numbers of the victims — it is because there is a more direct collective connection in Europe and the 
United States to the history of the Israel-Palestine confl ict than with any other non-Western regional 
confl ict.
I used the Hebrew designation Shoah instead of Holocaust — Shoah, as you know, means “catastrophe” 
(as does Nakba, incidentally) — because I dealt in the book, not with the genocide alone, but with the 
protracted catastrophic time that started with the Nazis coming to power and ended with their defeat in 
the Second World War. For this, the term Shoah is more relevant than Holocaust, which is actually a very 
disputable term in itself, one which many Jewish scholars reject because of its terrible etymology when 
applied to the fate of the Jews under the Nazis — what Raul Hilberg, the world’s preeminent scholar of the 
Holocaust, called “the destruction of the European Jews” in his authoritative three-volume study.
Now, if we take this long historical perspective, and just look at the fi gures, we fi nd that Jewish immigration 
to Palestine had dwindled to very low fi gures prior to the Nazi seizure of power (between 2,000 and 5,000 
per year from 1927 to 1931), with even negative immigration for some years when more Jews left  the 
country than entered it. Th e ascendance to power of the Nazis in 1933 naturally gave a major boost to 
the Zionist movement, which took it as a confi rmation of its view that Jews were simply unwelcome in 
Europe. In the clash of ideologies among European Jews, the advent of the Nazi state provided Zionism 
with the decisive boost it needed to implement its project. 
As you know, for a long time, Zionism remained a minority outlook among European Jews, where it 
was combatted by liberal assimilationists, Marxist internationalists, and various other currents like the 
Bund, which embodied socialist Jewish/Yiddish nationalism. To be clear, I never suggested that Jews are 
not allowed their nationalism — Professor Rovner misunderstood me on this. It is only that my attitude 
toward “nationalism” — any nationalism — depends on its nature, on whether it is emancipatory like that 
of the Bund in Eastern Europe or colonial like that of Zionism in Palestine.
So Zionism remained a minority trend among European Jews until it was given a major boost by Nazism, 
including a direct contribution by the Nazis to the emigration of German Jews to Palestine — both legal and 
illegal, the latter circumventing the reduced quotas imposed by British mandatory authorities, especially 
aft er the 1939 White Paper. Th is cooperation continued until 1941. Th is is abundantly documented in the 
defi nitive study of the subject, University of Vermont historian and Holocaust scholar Francis Nicosia’s 
book on Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany.
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In addition to all that, consider the 1947 UN resolution on the partition of Palestine: Jews constituted a 
third of the population of Palestine, the vast majority of them having immigrated during the previous 15 
years. Th en you have a resolution giving the future “Jewish state” 55 percent of Palestine’s territory. Even 
if you believe that recent immigrants have the same right to a territory as the people who have lived there 
for generations, where was the equity in that resolution? 
Th e fact, of course, is that the “Jewish state” was seen as a place to which Jewish Holocaust survivors, 
hitherto living as “displaced persons” in camps in Europe, were to be sent. Europe wanted to get rid of 
them, and the United States did not want to take them in. In the fi nal analysis, as Th eodor Herzl himself 
put it in his well-known manifesto whose title is wrongly translated in English as Th e Jewish State (whereas 
it should be Th e State of the Jews), the “propelling force” of Zionism is anti-Semitism, “the misery of the 
Jews,” as Herzl wrote. Th is is indeed the dialectic which led to the implementation of the Zionist statist 
project.
Another important remark Professor Rovner made about my book is that I myself have been guilty of 
the “beam and mote” type of ethnocentrism in rejecting the monolithic, homogeneous representation 
of the Arabs while engaging in exactly the same for Zionism. I contend that this is again a misreading of 
what I wrote, which is very much the contrary. Allow me to read you a brief excerpt of my book, where I 
comment on Avraham Burg, who served as president of the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Movement, 
vice president of the World Jewish Congress, and Speaker of the Israeli Knesset, before authoring an 
important, deeply introspective and widely discussed book, Th e Holocaust Is Over: We Must Rise from Its 
Ashes. I wrote (p. 290 of the US edition):
  Burg saves the honor of one strain of Zionism, for the problem with the equation “Zionism = 
racism” is its totalizing nature. Th ere is Zionism and “Zionism,” as Martin Buber once wrote; we 
can hardly treat all Zionists, from Avnery (Uri) to Ze’evi (to mention only contemporaries while 
leaving “post-Zionists” aside), as birds of the same racist feather.
I am saying here exactly the contrary of what Professor Rovner reproached me for. As a matter of fact, 
I was publicly criticized from an Arab nationalist perspective for precisely this statement. I therefore 
resolutely plead Not Guilty to the accusation that I am lumping together all brands of Zionism.
Let me turn now to the issue of the Israeli state’s colonialist nature. First of all, to acknowledge the fact 
that a state came into existence as the outcome of a colonial enterprise — and I am speaking here to an 
audience in North America, of all places — does not imply a denial of the right of the population that 
resulted from this historical process to live on that state’s territory, especially when most of them are born 
there.
Acknowledging the fact that the United States came into existence through the colonization of this 
country by European immigrants, even characterizing what they perpetrated on the native population as 
a genocide, does not imply that there was no new 
American nation born in that process that has 
no right to exist on this territory. Several states 
on earth were actually the result of historical 
processes which were anything but fair or just. 
Th ere is a tendency to believe that if one 
acknowledges the settler-colonial character of the state of Israel, then one also shares the views expressed 
in the Hamas Charter. Th at is simply not true. Many post-Zionists, several of Israel’s New Historians, “There is a tendency to believe that if one acknowledges the settler-colonial character of the state of Israel, then one also shares the views expressed in the Hamas Charter. That is simply not true.
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acknowledge the settler-colonial character of the state of Israel. Th e fact is that Th eodor Herzl explicitly 
referred to the model of white European settler colonialism in his blueprint for the Zionist state. Th is is 
important to acknowledge. 
When I stress the necessity of mutual recognition of the Holocaust and the Nakba, it is fi rst of all because 
of the crucial importance of a recognition by the Israelis of the historical injustice done to the Palestinians 
— not to mention, of course, the continuous oppression the Palestinians suff er at the hands of the Israeli 
state. Th e acknowledgment of that historical injustice is a prerequisite for a just peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians.
In the same way, although Palestinians and Arabs bear no direct responsibility for the Holocaust — unlike 
Israel’s, or the Israeli state’s, direct responsibility for the Nakba — I emphasize that the Arab side needs 
also to acknowledge the Holocaust and recognize its importance in the Israeli psyche in order to enable 
the mutual understanding without which there can be no real dialogue and no lasting peace.
Professor Rovner criticizes me for writing that “the Palestinian question [is] the last major burning issue 
of European colonialism,” and reminds us that the US, Australia and Brazil are also colonial entities, with 
the diff erence that they have extinguished the opposition. Here again, I plead Not Guilty to what I am 
accused of overlooking. When explaining why the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict is given more importance 
than various other ongoing confl icts and tragedies, I wrote (p. 26) that there are several reasons for this: 
  One is that Israel is the only European colonial settler state in which the political rights of the 
native population have yet to be restored (apart from places such as North America and Australia, 
where colonization all but wiped out the native populations).
I then went on to explain what is specifi c about the Israeli-Palestinian case. All this is done not because I 
advocate “throwing the Jews into the sea” or anything of the sort, needless to say, but because I believe that 
there can be no real peace between Arabs and Israelis without some “truth and reconciliation” process. 
In order to achieve reconciliation, as they endeavored to do in South Africa, you need to acknowledge 
the truth. Th at is why I believe that Israel’s New Historians, by acknowledging facts that were denied so 
vehemently in Israel for decades — and are still offi  cially denied — have played a crucial role in facilitating 
this dialogue.
I do believe that there is no peaceful future for Israel in Zionism — even in its liberal variation — but only 
in what is called in Israel post-Zionism, coexisting with an Arab environment that would have superseded 
all brands of nationalism. Nationalism is too oft en, as we can see again and again, a very deadly disease. 
Superseding nationalism is a precondition for the achievement of real peaceful coexistence between 
nations. 
Th ank you very much for your attention.
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